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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20030474-CA
vs.
RICHARD JEREMY MATTINSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT1
I.

THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE IS OVERBROAD AND
THEREFORE FACIALLY INVALID BECAUSE IT PROSCRIBES
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED SPEECH.
B.

THE NORMS DECISION IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS BECAUSE
THE STANDARD SET FORTH IN NEW YORK TIMES CO. V.
SULLIVAN DOES NOT APPLY TO CRIMINAL STATUTES.

This Court previously held in State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, that Utah Code
Ann. §76-10-1801 is constitutional, rejecting challenges to its vagueness and overbreadth.

There is some overlap of arguments herein involving the overbreadth and
vagueness of §76-10-1801. See, Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 n.8 (1983) ("We
have traditionally viewed vagueness and overbreadth as logically related and similar
doctrines."); see also, Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional
Law §§20.9 at 274 (3 ed. 1999) ("The problem of vagueness in statutes regulating speech
activities is based on the same rationale as the overbreadth doctrine and the Supreme
Court often speaks of them together.").

Id. at Tffl 8-16.2 Accordingly, the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis generally requires the
panels of this Court to follow the decisions of all other panels. See, e.g., Bonneville
Asphault v. Labor Com }n, 2004 UT App. 137, \ 16, 91 P.3d 849. However, that doctrine
does not apply if the Court is persuaded that the previous decision is clearly erroneous.
See, e.g., Manning v. State, 89 P.3d 196 (Utah App. 2004).
The Norris decision is clearly erroneous because this Court's reliance on New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) was a misapplication of the law as applied to
the constitutionality of criminal statutes that seek to regulate speech. Thus, this Court and
the state in its brief3 misapplied the facts of this case to the narrow legal standard
established in Sullivan and disregarded a large body of United States Supreme Court
decisions in support of a finding that the communications fraud statute is
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501
U.S. 496, 511 (1991 ) ("We have used the term actual malice as a shorthand to describe
the First Amendment protections for speech injurious to reputation."); Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., All U.S. 50, 67 (1976).
Norris stands for, and the state also takes the position, that any falsehood made
2

Portions of this section are attributable to Elizabeth Hunt, attorney for Richard
Norris in Case No. 20030817-CA, who previously briefed the impact of the Norris
decision on the issue of constitutionality.
3

All of the cases cited by the state are relevant to civil actions for defamation and
thus irrelevant to a criminal statute that proscribes speech. Moreover, the state cites no
authority supportive of its position in the context of a criminal statute. Brief of Appellee,
at 7-13.
?

with a reckless disregard for the truth for the purpose of obtaining anything of value from
another, is not protected by the First Amendment, and is therefore subject to criminal
sanctions under the Utah communications fraud statute. This is a stunning proposition in
and of itself. "My dog ate my homework," is a second degree felony. So is, "Of course
you don't look fat in that dress." First Amendment jurisprudence in the context of a
criminal statute does not accord with this unique and unconstitutional point of view.
In Sullivan, which does not apply to a criminal statute regulating speech, the
Court held that for a defendant to be civilly liable to a plaintiff for libel, (1) the plaintiff
must be a public figure; (2) the statements at issue must be defamatory in that they are
injurious to the plaintiffs reputation; and (3) the statements were made with actual malice,
or with at least a reckless disregard for the truth. Id. These facts are inapposite to the facts
in this case where the ultimate issue is criminal rather than civil liability. Yet even
contrary to this incorrectly applied civil standard, §76-10-1801 requires no harm or intent
to harm, despite the fact that the defendant's weightier liberty interests are at stake.4 There
is no need to prove that statements are defamatory. There is no requirement to prove even
harmful intent. Yet the punishment for communications fraud may be 1-15 years in
prison.

4

Mattinson has served 47 days in the Utah County Jail for the second degree felony
of communications fraud in this case. The defendant in Norris served approximately 3
years in prison and 270 days in jail for multiple counts of communications fraud arising
out of two counties.
3

In summary, Sullivan does not stand for the proposition that all falsehoods made
knowingly or with a reckless disregard for the truth are unprotected speech. Rather,
Sullivan "designed a constitutional privilege intended to free criticism of public officials
from the restraints imposed by the common law of defamation," Gertz v. Robert Welch
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1973). Norris is unaware of any precedent that applies the standard of
Sullivan to a criminal statute restricting speech. Accordingly, Sullivan is limited to its civil
context and has no bearing on the constitutionality of a criminal statute.
C.

BY ITS PLAIN TERMS, §76-10-1801 UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
PROSCRIBES SPEECH WITHOUT REGARD FOR CONTENT OR
PLACE OR WHETHER IT POSES A CLEAR AND PRESENT
DANGER, AND IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO
MATTINSON.

The appropriate analysis of a criminal statute that regulates speech is set forth in
Schenckv. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), wherein Justice Holmes stated, "The
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. . . . The
question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has the right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and
degree." Id. at 52 (emphasis added). See also, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
507-508 (1951) (explaining when a criminal statute imposes a "direct restriction upon
speech, a 'clear and present danger' that the substantive evil would be caused was
necessary before the statute in question could be constitutionally applied."); Thomas v.

4

Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (U.S.) Ow[A]ny attempt to restrict [First Amendment] liberties must
be justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and
present danger.55). The actual malice standard does not apply on these facts.
Under the proximity and degree analysis in Schenck, a criminal statute that seeks
to regulate certain speech, such as recklessly made falsehoods, may not proscribe all such
speech without regard for its content or the place in which it is made. Smith v. United
States, 431 U.S. 291, 318 n 16 (1977) (explaining that a criminal statute may not proscribe
all potentially dangerous speech, without taking into account content ("Fire!55) and place (a
crowded theater) (citing and quoting Schenck)). The possibility that some unprotected
speech may go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech may be
muted. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 60.
In other words, contrary to the sweeping language of §76-10-1801, the knowingly
false statement, "When I am elected President, I will ensure quality health care for all
Americans, and I will not raise taxes,5" may not subject the speaker to criminal sanctions
unless and until the government can establish that a clear and present danger exists every
time that statement is made and in every context in which it is made. See, Id. at 64-65
("the line between permissible advocacy and impermissible incitation to crime or violence
depends, not merely on the setting in which the speech occurs, but also on exactly what the
speaker had to say.55).
It is not disputed here that the legislature has a legitimate interest in preventing

5

and prosecuting fraud. However, statutes that implicate First Amendment freedoms must
be "narrowly tailored" to achieve government interests. Riley v. Nat'I Fed'n of Blind, 487
U.S. 781, 788 (1988) (finding fundraising ordinance targeting fraudulent schemes
unconstitutionally overbroad, and that "government regulation of speech must be
measured in minimums, not maximums." Id. at 790). Notwithstanding these First
Amendment restrictions on efforts to regulate speech, §76-10-1801 casts such a large net
for all possible offenders, regardless of intent or content or place of speech, that it is
effectively "burning the house to roast the pig." Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 822 (1997)
(citation omitted) (holding statute seeking to regulate internet pornography
unconstitutionally overbroad). Similarly, the communications fraud statute "threatens to
torch" all persons who do or say anything remotely dishonest for even a harmless purpose
of obtaining anything of value from another. Id.
The communications fraud statute does not just proscribe speech that may pose a
clear and present danger. It criminalizes all falsehoods made with at least a reckless
disregard for the truth, even if they are not harmful. The fact that the statute may
legitimately proscribe some criminal conduct is not sufficient to survive constitutional
scrutiny. "The prospect of crime . . . by itself does not justify laws suppressing protected
speech." Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
The pertinent constitutional decisions in the context of criminal fraud statutes
confirm that the Utah communications fraud statute is indeed unconstitutionally

6

overbroad, because under its plain terms, it makes a second degree felony of any
intentional or recklessly uttered falsehood designed to obtain something of value from
another, without requiring any intent to defraud, success in defrauding, or danger - either
clear or present. To the contrary, it encompasses a wide array of communicative conduct
which is not fraudulent.5
Even as applied to the facts of this case, there was no "clear and present danger"
that the statute deterred. Notwithstanding the state's arguments about how Mattinson's
conduct might conceivably fit within the broad parameters of the statute, not even the state
is making the absurd claim that if Wells and Mattinson had truthfully represented their
identities, the hospital would have refused to treat Wells for life-threatening meningitis.
No one can credibly argue that Wells obtained treatment because Mattinson pretended to
be her husband. To the contrary, Mattinson could have dropped Wells off at the ER door,
and she still would have obtained treatment, particularly if she was delirious. Moreover,
whether Mattinson would even be held civilly liable for the cost of Wells' treatment is
unlikely, but is in any event an issue more appropriately determined in a civil proceeding.
See, People v. Moran, 632 NE.2d 1115, 1121 (111. App. 2nd Dist. 1994) ("Just as a debtorcreditor relationship cannot be the basis for criminal liability, the criminal justice system
cannot be allowed to be used as a collection agency for a civil litigant." Id. at 1121).

5

See, e.g., Provo City v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1989) (recognizing First
Amendment protection of private sexual speech and conduct between consenting adults).
7

Because Mattinson was not found on these facts to have defrauded the hospital of medical
services, §76-10-1801 statute is also unconstitutional as applied to him.
C.

§76-10-1801 IS OVERBROAD AND VAGUE, PARTICULARLY AS
APPLIED TO MATTINSON, BECAUSE IT HAS NO CORE OF
EASILY IDENTIFIABLE CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROSCRIBABLE CONDUCT.

A statute is substantially overbroad if "there is no core of easily identifiable and
constitutionally proscribable conduct that the statute prohibits." Secretary of Maryland v.
Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 965 (1984). A criminal statute that does not
distinguish between constitutionally protected and constitutionally proscribable activities
is overbroad and facially invalid. Id. at 966. This overbreadth problem also relates to a
statute's vagueness. "The increased deterrent effect of a vague criminal provision,
coupled with the risk of discriminatory enforcement, poses greater concerns with respect
to the freedom of speech protected by the Federal Constitution's First Amendment than
those implicated by a civil regulation." Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
Because the statute at issue is written to proscribe both harmful and innocuous
behavior, as evidenced by its terms, there is no core of easily identifiable constitutionally
proscribable conduct. The harmless practical joke or the "white lie" is indistinguishable
from the organized scheme to defraud. And the defendant who takes his critically ill
friend to-the hospital and falsely represents himself to be her husband so he can stay with
her, is prosecuted for the same offense as the organized scheme to defraud vulnerable
senior citizens out of their retirement. Thus, there is no core of easily identifiable conduct
8

such that Martinson could have foreseen that he would be subject to prosecution for
helping his friend.
In Norris, this Court focused solely on mens rea, thereby omitting consideration
of the question of overbreadth in the context of all the broad and vague statutory language,
notwithstanding the incorrect application of Sullivan. Yet, the Utah communications fraud
statute even deviates from its common law roots. It is patterned after the common law
crime of false pretenses which has been codified in many states.6 However, Utah's

6

False pretenses is a form of theft by deception or larceny and is encompassed by
statutes dealing with such crimes in other jurisdictions. What follows are just a few
examples that are illustrative:
Cal. Pen. Code §532, False Pretenses: Every person who knowingly and
designedly, by a false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defrauds any other person
of money, labor, or property, whether real or personal, or who causes or procures others
to report falsely of his or her wealth or mercantile character, and by thus imposing upon
any person obtains credit, and thereby fraudulently gets possession of money or property,
or obtains the labor or service of another, is punishable in the same manner and to the
same extent as for larceny of the money or property so obtained.
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18-4-403 (false pretenses encompassed by theft and
requires proof of intent to defraud of measurable monetary value or something that
anyone other than the defendant has a possessory or proprietary interest in).
See also, e.g., Conn. Gen Stat. Ann. §53a-l 19 ("A person obtains property by false
pretenses when, by any false token, pretense, or device, he obtains from another any
property, with intent to defraud him or any other person."); Del. Code Ann., Title 11,
§843 (similar); D.C. Code §22-3221 ("A person commits the offense of fraud . . . if that
person engages in a scheme or systematic course of conduct with intent to defraud or to
obtain property of another by means of false or fraudulent pretense, representation, or
promise and thereby obtains property of another or causes another to lose property (lesser
offense in subsequent subsection if property not obtained)).
9

provision departs from the common law in ways that infringe upon First Amendment
protections by creating a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, thereby again
"burning the house to roast the pig." Reno v. ACLU, supra.
Under the common law, the elements that generally must be proven to establish
false pretenses are (1) a representation of a past event or existing fact that is untrue
{UnitedStates v. Bales, 813 F.2d 1289 (4th Cir. 1987); (2) calculated to mislead (People v.
Caruso, 345 P.2d 282 (Ca. 1960), cert den, 363 U.S. 819 (I960)); (3) intended to induce
the person to whom it is made to part with something of value (People v. Jones, 224 P.2d
353 (Ca. 1950)); and (4) the person to whom it is made relies upon the false representation
and suffers injury by parting with the thing of value (Id.).
A statute with substantive similarity to §76-10-1801 is Ariz. Stat. Ann. §13-2310,
Fraudulent Schemes and Artifices:7 "Any person who, pursuant to a scheme or artifice to
defraud, knowingly obtains any benefit by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, promises or material omissions is guilty of a class 2 felony." Consistent
with the law cited herein, even a cursory glance at this provision reveals that unlike the
Utah statute, there is no criminal liability unless it can be proven that a defendant intended

7

The only other state to enact a statute explicitly dealing with the crime of
"communications fraud" is the Florida Communications Fraud Act, Title 46, §817.034,
which, unlike the Utah provision, is specifically aimed at schemes to defraud via various
communications technology. Also unlike the Utah communications fraud provision,
Florida's statute expressly defines "schemes to defraud," "property," and "value" and
requires proof of an intent to defraud. The Florida provision also defines "communicate"
much more narrowly than the Utah provision.
10

to defraud. Indeed, without exception, all jurisdictions except for Utah require proof of
intent to defraud for comparable offenses. See, United States v. Royal, 100 F.3d 1019 (1st
Cir. 1996); United States v. Lane, 323 F.3d 568 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Grissom,
44 F.3d 1057, cert den, 131 L.Ed. 2d 579 (1995); United States v. Chandler, 98 F.3d 711
(2nd Cir. 1996) (intent to harm essential element that must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt); People v. Stewart, 739 P.2d 854 (Colo. 1987); State v. Rochette, 594 A.2d 1006
(Conn.App. 1991).
Even under Utah's theft by deception statute, which is also based upon the
common law crime of false pretenses, it is essential to prove fraudulent intent. State v.
Fowler, 745 P.2d 472 (Utah App. 1987). Not requiring an intent to defraud creates an
inherent ambiguity in §76-10-1801 and thereby unconstitutionally widens the net in which
unsuspecting offenders, such as Martinson, may be caught unawares.
Because the Utah communications fraud statute has "no core of easily identifiable
and constitutionally proscribable conduct," and thus risks the chilling of free speech, and
because the goal of fraud prevention can easily be attained by far narrower means, this
Court should strike the communications statute on overbreadth grounds.
II.

§76-10-1801 IMPLICATES CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED
SPEECH AND IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS.
The state's position that the statute at issue does not implicate the First

Amendment is based upon an incorrect interpretation of the law. As shown above, §7610-1801 implicates First Amendment interests in that it seeks to regulate speech, period.
11

See, United States v. Jackson, 199 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (10th Cir. 2002) (explaining that when
a statute involves First Amendment freedoms, one may challenge the statute for vagueness
even if the statute clearly applies to the challenger's conduct) (emphasis added); United
States v. Pourhassen, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1189-1190 (10th Cir. 2001) (facial challenge
to statute that threatened speech or conduct protected by the First Amendment was proper).
Under the Supreme Court authority cited in the section above, there can be no
serious dispute that the Utah communications fraud statute implicates First Amendment
freedoms. See, i.e., Schenckv. United States, 249 U.S., supra, and its progeny. Therefore,
Mattinson can challenge the statute on vagueness grounds regardless of whether the statute
is "impermissibly vague in all of its applications," Norris, 2004 UT App 267, % 12 (citation
omitted), and notwithstanding the fact that it is impermissibly vague as applied to him.
"[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the
criminal offense with sufficient defmiteness that ordinary people can understand
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice
to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more
important aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but the other
principal element of the doctrine - the requirement that a legislature establish
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. Where the legislature fails to
provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit a standardless
sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal
predilections. . . It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net
large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step
inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large.
This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department
of government."
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-358 (citations and quotations omitted).

12

As has previously been argued, there are many ambiguities in the
communications fraud statute. The fact that no harm or intent to harm is required creates
inherent ambiguities relative to the statute's scope of application. The addition of the
"anything "of value" language, the unlimited scope of the defined term "communicate," and
the innocuous meaning of "artifice," opens the door to arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement as wide as a prosecutor's discretion allows.
The ambiguities created by these terms extend the scope of the statute's reach
well-beyond criminal culpability, and thereby render the statute "problematic for purposes
of the First Amendment." Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 870-871 (holding criminal statute
regulating pornography void for vagueness given the "absence of a definition" for core
terms such that a speaker may not confidently assume what activities were prohibited by
the statute).
While the communications fraud statute proscribes artifices "to defraud another,"
it also proscribes artifices to obtain something of value, which is a subjective and
therefore, unconstitutionally vague term. LM.L. v. State, 2002 UT 110, at ^[25 (citations
omitted) ("[T]o avoid chilling the exercise of vital First Amendment rights, restriction of
expression must be expressed in terms which clearly inform citizens of prohibited conduct
and in terms susceptible of objective measurement."); See also, Graynedv. Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (vagueness doctrine requires laws not only to give citizens notice
of proscribed behavior, but also prevents those who are to enforce the laws from

13

.exercising what should be the legislative prerogative in discriminatory application of
vague laws).
While the Norris Court rejected his challenge to the "anything of value" language
because the evidence supported a finding that he engaged in a scheme to defraud people of
money, Norris, f 15, the information in this case alleged that Mattinson engaged in a
scheme or artifice to defraud or to obtain anything of value (R. 2). As noted in
Martinson's opening brief, and contrary to the state's arguments and the record, the jury
specifically requested instructions regarding the meaning of "anything of value,"
specifically as that phrase related to the obtaining of medical treatment rather than
monetary value (R. 142); Brf. of Appt., ADDENDUM A. The state's arguments suggesting
that Mattinson was convicted on the basis of intent to defraud the hospital are therefore
disingenuous. Brf. of Appe. 16.
A.

EVEN THE STATE DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THE STATUTE.

The state concedes that the "anything of value" language is "quite broad." Id.
Moreover, the state concedes that the state advanced two separate theories in its
prosecution of Mattinson to increase the odds of obtaining a conviction at trial. Id Such
prosecutorial tactics defeat the state's own arguments that a "statute must define the
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement," and that Mattinson was not prevented from adequately preparing his
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defense by the vague and broad application of the statute to this case. Id. at 13-14.
The state's prosecutorial tactics set forth in the record and conceded by the state
demonstrate that even the state did not know how to define "anything of value" and
therefore, had to guess at its meaning. Notably, no one is arguing that the state's trial
counsel was not a person of at least common intelligence. See, Provo City v. Thompson,
44 P.3d 828, 834 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (adhering to the standard that a statute is void for
vagueness if persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning).
To the contrary, during trial the state rightly assumed that value might be anything the jury
might accept as such, even though it could not be objectively measured.
In its brief, the state ignores the facts of this case, the record, and the plain
language of §76-10-1801 in asserting that "[a] scheme to avoid detection by the authorities
. . . does not fit the meaning of a 'scheme or artifice . . . to obtain from another . . .
anything of value.'" Id. at 16. While it is arguable whether a person may be able to obtain
anonymity from another, a person may certainly obtain peace of mind from another who is
providing a loved one with necessary medical treatment. That the jury so found is
consistent with the record (R. 142).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing facts and law, Appellant, Richard Jeremy Martinson,
respectfully requests this Court to vacate his convictions on the grounds that § 76-10-1801
is unconstitutional in that it is both overly broad and void for vagueness. In the
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alternative, Mattinson requests this Court to find the statute unconstitutional as applied to
him.

Respectfully submitted this *f"\ Lii-day of October, 2004.
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC

JennifedK. Gowans
I/
Attorneys for Defendant
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